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THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE, THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AND INDIRECT
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Tessa L. Dysart*
“All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representa-
tives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on
other Bills.”
U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (Origination Clause).
“As we have often noted, ‘[c]onstitutional rights would be of little value
if they could be . . . indirectly denied.’”
United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995)
The Supreme Court’s opinion in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, upholding the constitutionality of the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) as a permissible exercise of Con-
gress’s taxing power rekindled an old question about the
constitutionality of the Act: Was the Act unconstitutional under the Orig-
ination Clause?  The bill that became the ACA, H.R. 3590, originated in
the House as the Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009.  It
was gutted by the Senate and replaced with the ACA before being passed
and sent back to the House for final passage.
The Supreme Court has heard very few cases on the Origination
Clause, and Origination Clause challenges have met with little success.
Most of these cases have developed over the questions of whether the bill
is actually a revenue-raising bill that is constitutionally required to be
originate in the House, and, if so, whether the Senate amendments were
appropriate.  But United States Term Limits v. Thornton provides an-
other angle under which to examine the constitutionality of the ACA: an
indirect violation of a constitutional prohibition.  In this Article, I will
provide an overview of the ACA’s passage and analyze it through the
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Kartchner, John Tuskey, and James Duane for their helpful comments and suggestions and
Leah Achor, Kathleen Knudsen, and Nicholas Lee for their research assistance and helpful
feedback.
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lenses of traditional Origination Clause arguments and the Term Limits
approach.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).1  Several states
quickly filed lawsuits after the signing, claiming that the Act, and partic-
ularly the individual mandate provision, was, among other things, be-
yond Congress’s Commerce Clause power.2  On June 28, 2012, the
Court upheld the individual mandate’s “financial penalty” on those who
do not have health insurance as a permissible exercise of Congress’s tax-
ing power.3  That decision raised a different question about the Act’s
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
2 Complaint at 16, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV-EMT) [hereinafter Florida Complaint]; Com-
plaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5–6, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728
F. Supp 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 3:10-CV- 00188-HEH).
3 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).  In reaching his
decision, Chief Justice John Roberts, in a portion of the opinion that the other Justices in the
majority did not join, also determined that the Act was beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause
power. Id. at 2585–93.  The four dissenting Justices, although they did not join any part of
Chief Justice Roberts’s decision, agreed that the Act was beyond Congress’s commerce power.
Id. at 2648.  Since the Court’s decision, there has been uncertainty over the precedential value
of the portion of the Chief Justice’s opinion discussing the Commerce Clause. See Timothy
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passage: Was the Act unconstitutional under the Origination Clause?4
H.R. 3590, the bill that became the ACA, originated in the House as the
Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009.5  The House
passed the Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009 on Octo-
ber 8, 2009, sending it to the Senate.6  The Senate deleted the entire text
of the Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, replaced it
with the ACA, passed the bill, and sent it back to the House for final
passage.7  On October 11, 2012, Pacific Legal Foundation, one of the
many organizations with active court challenges to the ACA on behalf of
Matt Sissel, amended its complaint to allege that the ACA was unconsti-
tutional under the Origination Clause,8 which states, “All bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate
may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”9
The Supreme Court has heard very few Origination Clause cases.10
Its decisions have focused primarily on whether the challenged bill was,
Sandefur, Ninth Circuit Asks: What Parts of the Obamacare Decision Are Binding?, PLF
LIBERTY BLOG (Aug. 10, 2012), http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2012/ninth-circuit-asks-what-
parts-of-the-obamacare-decision-are-binding/; William A. Jacobson, What If that Huge Con-
servative Doctrinal Achievement Was Mere Dicta?, LEGAL INSURRECTION (June 29, 2012, 4:36
PM), http://legalinsurrection.com/2012/06/what-if-that-huge-conservative-doctrinal-achieve-
ment-was-mere-dicta/.
4 Michael Patrick Leahy, Justice Roberts Turns Obamacare into Origination Clause
Shell Game, BREITBART (July 1, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2012/07/01/
justice-roberts/; Joseph E. Schmitz, Challenge Obamacare Under “Origination Clause,” NEW-
SMAX (July 10, 2012, 11:58 AM), http://www.newsmax.com/TheWire/obamacare-healthcare-
origination-clause/2012/07/10/id/444912.
5 155 CONG. REC. H9729 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2009); Actions - H.R.3590 - 111th Con-
gress (2009–2010): Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, CONGRESS.GOV, http://
beta.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/3590/actions?q=hr3590 (last visited Feb. 28,
2015) [hereinafter ACA Legislative History] (“Passed/agreed to in House . . . . Passed/agreed to
in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote.
60–39.”).
6 155 CONG. REC. H10,554 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2009); ACA Legislative History, supra
note 5. R
7 156 CONG. REC. H2153 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010); 155 CONG. REC. S13,891 (daily ed.
Dec. 24, 2009); ACA Legislative History, supra note 5 (“Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed R
Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60–39 . . . .
[T]he House agree to the Senate amendments . . . 219–212.”).
8 Proposed Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at
10–12, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.D.C. 2013)
(No. 1:10-CV-01263-BAH) [hereinafter Sissel Amended Complaint], aff’d, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).  Two plaintiffs in Texas filed another Origination Clause challenge in May 2013.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7–10, Hotze v. Sebelius, 991 F. Supp. 2d
864 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 4:13-cv-01318).  Other litigants have raised the origination issue in
their cases as well. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 468
(D.C. Cir. 2014); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 87 n.3 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 683 (2013) (holding that the origination claim was waived because it was not
initially raised in the district court or in plaintiff’s original briefing on appeal).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
10 Rebecca Kysar, The “Shell Bill” Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause, 91
WASH. U. L. REV. 659, 673 (2014) (“The Supreme Court has spoken on the meaning of the
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in fact, a bill for raising revenue under the Origination Clause.11  Other
cases have looked at the permissibility of Senate amendments to House
revenue bills.12  These two questions form the heart of Pacific Legal
Foundation’s challenge to the ACA in Sissel v. United States Department
of Health and Human Services.13  There is, however, a third question to
consider—a question that finds its foundation in a different line of cases.
Even if Congress’s actions in passing the ACA met the technical require-
ments of the Origination Clause, is this process of passing bills—particu-
larly the delete and replace14 process used by the Senate—“an indirect
attempt to accomplish what the Constitution prohibits [Congress] from
accomplishing directly”?15  This reasoning was important to the Court’s
decision in United States Term Limits v. Thornton, which struck down
the part of Arkansas’s Amendment 73 that, according to the majority,
instituted term limits for members of Congress.16  This reasoning has
also appeared in other Supreme Court cases.17  In this Article, I will ex-
plore whether the Court should hold the ACA unconstitutional under the
same reasoning.  Is the ACA an attempt to circumvent the Constitution
and accomplish indirectly what the Constitution forbids the Senate from
doing directly?
In Part I, I will provide a brief history of the ACA’s passage.  In
Part II, I will explore whether the ACA directly violates the Origination
Clause by looking at the traditional questions raised by Origination
Clause cases: (1) Is the ACA a bill for raising revenue?  And (2) is the
Senate permitted to completely substitute the text of a bill under the
Origination Clause only a handful of times . . . .”).  For examples of the few cases regarding
the Origination Clause that the Court has considered, see United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495
U.S. 385 (1990); Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
U.S. 107 (1911); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906); Twin City Nat’l Bank v. Nebeker,
167 U.S. 196 (1897); Lumberman’s Bank v. Huston, 167 U.S. 203 (1897); United States v.
Norton, 91 U.S. 566 (1875).  As Professor Rebecca Kysar has pointed out, United States v.
Norton is not technically an Origination Clause case, although it is often treated as one.  Kysar,
supra, at 674.  Nonetheless, the Court in Norton did interpret the Clause, thus making the case
useful. Norton, 91 U.S. at 568–69.
11 See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 397–401; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436–37; Twin City
Nat’l. Bank, 167 U.S. at 202–03; Lumberman’s Bank, 167 U.S. at 203; Norton, 91 U.S. at
568–69.
12 See Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317; Flint, 220 U.S. at 142–43.
13 Sissel Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 10–12. R
14 Traditionally, the process of using an amendment to completely replace the text of a
bill is called “gut and amend.”  California State Legislature, Glossary of Legislative Terms,
CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE, http://www.legislature.ca.gov/quicklinks/glossary.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2015).  The terms “delete and replace,” however, are more accurate in terms of
what the legislative body is actually doing.  Therefore, I will use the terms “delete and replace”
rather than “gut and amend” throughout this Article.
15 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995).
16 Id. at 829, 837.
17 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998); Powell v. Mc-
Cormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547–48 (1969).
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Origination Clause?  Finally, in Part III, I will examine the Supreme
Court’s decisions addressing indirect constitutional violations and ana-
lyze why the passage of the ACA—even if it meets the requirements of
the Court’s existing Origination Clause jurisprudence—should not be
permitted under the Origination Clause’s history and purpose.
I. THE ACA’S PASSAGE
Barack Obama was not the first president to promote national health
care reform.  In fact, although the proposed plans differ, prior Republican
and Democratic presidents have proposed reforming health care at a na-
tional level.18  Barack Obama, like Bill Clinton before him, made na-
tional health care reform an important part of his campaign.19  On
February 24, 2009, in his first remarks to a joint session of Congress,
President Obama specifically discussed the need for national health care
reform, stating that “the cost of our health care has weighed down our
economy and the conscience of our nation long enough” and that the
issue “cannot wait, it must not wait, and it will not wait another year.”20
Just five months later, on July 14, 2009, America’s Affordable Health
Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, was introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives.21  The bill was considered in three House committees, but
never voted on by the House.22  Less than four months later, another bill,
the Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, was introduced
in the House on October 29, 2009.23  The House passed this bill less than
a week and a half later on November 7, 2009, by a vote of 220–215.24
18 Farah Stockman, Op-Ed, Recalling the Nixon-Kennedy Health Plan, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 23, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/06/22/stockman/bvg57mguQxOVp
ZMmB1Mg2N/story.html (discussing Richard Nixon’s efforts to reform health care); James P.
Pfiffner, President Clinton’s Health Care Reform Proposals of 1994, in TRIUMPHS AND TRAG-
EDIES OF THE MODERN PRESIDENCY: SEVENTY-SIX CASE STUDIES IN PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
69–71 (David M. Abshire ed., 2001).
19 Barack Obama, Candidate for President of the United States, Acceptance Speech at
the Democratic National Convention (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://millercenter.org/presi
dent/speeches/detail/4427; Barack Obama, Candidate for President of the United States,
Speech at Families USA Conference: The Time Has Come for Universal Health Care (Jan. 25,
2007), available at http://obamaspeeches.com/097-The-Time-Has-Come-for-Universal-
Health-Care-Obama-Speech.htm; William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States,
Address on Health Care Reform (Sept. 22, 1993), available at http://millercenter.org/president/
speeches/detail/3926.
20 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Address to Joint Session of Congress
(Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-Presi
dent-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress.
21 155 CONG. REC. H8099 (daily ed. July 14, 2009).  The bills discussed in this Article
may not represent the totality of the health care reform bills considered by Congress, but they
do represent some of the major proposals that were considered.
22 155 CONG. REC. H11,383 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 2009).
23 155 CONG. REC. H12,140 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 2009).
24 155 CONG. REC. H12,967–68 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009).
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On the Senate side, two committees took the lead on health care reform.
On July 15, 2009, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
Committee approved along party lines a health care bill that had been
released in draft form in June.25  In the Senate Finance Committee, Sena-
tor Max Baucus released a draft version of his health care reform bill on
September 16, 2009.26  The draft bill was considered in Committee and
formally introduced on October 19, 2009, as Senate Bill 1796.27
H.R. 3590, the bill that ultimately became the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, was introduced in the House on September 17,
2009, as the Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009.28  The
House unanimously approved H.R. 3590 on October 8, 2009.29  As
passed by the House, the six-page long bill permitted members of the
military, the intelligence community, and the Foreign Service who had
taken advantage of the first-time homeowners tax credit to sell their
home within three years of purchase without a penalty.30  It also ex-
tended by one year the availability of the first-time homeowners tax
credit for persons who served at least ninety days outside of the United
States on “qualified official extended duty” in the year 2009.31  The re-
maining sections of the bill excluded from taxable income money re-
ceived by certain individuals under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 “to offset the adverse effects on housing val-
ues that result[ed] from a military base realignment or closure”;32 raised
the penalty for not filing a partnership or S corporation return;33 and
increased for a few months corporate estimated tax payments. 34  Noth-
ing in H.R. 3590, as originally passed by the House, mentioned anything
relevant to health care or health insurance.
25 David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Committee Approves Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2009, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/senate-committee-approves-
health-care-bill/?_r=0; Ezra Klein, The Senate HELP Committee Releases (Most of) Its Health
Reform Bill, WASH. POST, June 9, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/06/
the_senate_help_committee_rele.html.
26 Press Release, Senate Finance Committee, Baucus Introduces Landmark Plan to
Lower Health Care Costs, Provide Quality, Affordable Coverage (Sept. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=4bed55c7-a06e-4a21-a798-
2f830a31e0d0.
27 155 CONG. REC. S10,520 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 2009).
28 155 CONG. REC. H9729 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2009).
29 155 CONG. REC. H11,126 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2009).
30 Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 2(a)
(2009); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-39-09, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 3590, THE
“SERVICE MEMBERS HOME OWNERSHIP TAX ACT OF 2009” SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON OCTOBER 7, 2009 (2009).
31 H.R. 3590; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 30, at 4. R
32 H.R. 3590; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 30, at 5–6. R
33 H.R. 3590; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 30, at 7. R
34 H.R. 3590; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 30, at 9.
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H.R. 3590 was received by the Senate on October 8, 2009.35  On
November 19, 2009, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced the
Senate’s health care reform legislation, which had been crafted from the
above mentioned Senate committee bills,36 as a substitute to H.R. 3590,
completely deleting the original bill’s text and adding the ACA’s text in
its place.37  By a party-line vote, the Senate first invoked cloture on the
bill on November 21, 2009.38  After considering amendments for over
three weeks,39 the Senate invoked cloture the final time on December 23,
2009,40 and H.R. 3590 passed the Senate as amended on December 24,
2009, on a party-line vote.41
Although the health care bill that the House had passed in Novem-
ber 2009 differed from the Senate’s version—most noticeably in the Sen-
ate bill’s lack of a public health insurance option42—the House voted on
March 21, 2010, to agree to the Senate amendments to H.R. 3590.43
President Obama signed the bill into law two days later.44  One of the
factors prompting the House’s vote was, undoubtedly, the Democrats’
loss of a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate.45  Following the 2008
election, the filling of vacancies caused by senators joining the adminis-
tration, the April 2009 party switch of Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Spec-
ter, and Al Franken’s official win of the contested Minnesota Senate
race, the Senate Democrats had sixty votes in their caucus—a filibuster-
proof majority.46  On August 26, 2009, Massachusetts Senator Ted Ken-
35 155 CONG. REC. S10,327 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2009).
36 Ted Barrett et al., Senate Leader Unveils $849 Billion Health Care Bill, CNN.COM
(Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/11/18/health.care/.
37 U.S. SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., LEGISLATIVE NOTICE: H.R. 3590: THE
QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS ACT 1–2 (Dec. 2, 2009).
38 See 155 CONG. REC. S11,967 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2009); see also U.S. Senate Roll Call
Votes 111th Congress—1st Session, On the Cloture Motion, H.R. 3590, U.S. SENATE.GOV,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&
session=1&vote=00353#state (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
39 155 CONG. REC. S13,834 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009).
40 Id.
41 155 CONG. REC. S13,891 (daily ed. Dec. 24, 2009); see also U.S. Senate Roll Call
Votes 111th Congress—1st Session, On the Passage of the Bill, H.R. 3590, SENATE.GOV, http://
www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session
=1&vote=00396#position (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
42 Public Option May Be Dropped from Final Health Care Bill, CNN.COM (Dec. 28,
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/28/health.care/index.html.
43 156 CONG. REC. H1891 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010).
44 See Key Features of the Affordable Care Act, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.health
care.gov/law/timeline/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
45 Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Hails Vote on Health Care as Answer-
ing “the Call of History,” N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/
health/policy/22health.html?pagewanted=2.
46 Manu Raju & Josh Kraushaar, Norm Coleman Concedes Minnesota Senate Race to Al
Franken, POLITICO (July 1, 2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/24383.html.
The two independent senators in the 111th Congress caucused with the Democrats. JENNIFER
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nedy, a staunch proponent of health care reform, passed away.47  Paul
Kirk Jr., who had been selected to temporarily fill Senator Kennedy’s
seat,48 voted for H.R. 3590, which allowed the Democrats to retain their
filibuster-proof majority and invoke cloture as needed.49  However, Re-
publican Scott Brown won the January 19, 2010, Massachusetts special
election to serve the remainder of Senator Kennedy’s term.50  Senator
Brown’s election, which deprived Democrats of their sixty-vote majority,
was seen in political circles as a vote against health care, because the
Democrats no longer had a filibuster-proof majority.51  Senator Brown
was sworn into office on February 4, 2010.52  Thus, by March 2010, the
House could not return an amended health care bill to the Senate for easy
approval.  Nor could it negotiate with the Senate over the differences
between the House and Senate proposals, as any bill would not pass a
cloture vote in the Senate.53  As Representative Diana DeGette noted in
2013, “‘We had to take the Senate version of the health care bill.’”54
After its passage, the Act was challenged in court almost immedi-
ately by several states, individuals, and organizations.55  The lawsuits,
among other things, challenged Congress’s constitutional power to enact
E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40086, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 111TH CONGRESS: A
PROFILE 1 (2010).
47 Emily Smith, Timeline of the Health Care Law, CNN.COM (June 28, 2012), http://
www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/politics/supreme-court-health-timeline.
48 Dan Fletcher, Paul Kirk Jr., Kennedy’s Replacement, TIME.COM (Sept. 24, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1925686,00.html.
49 155 CONG. REC. S13,891(daily ed. Dec. 24, 2009).
50 Matt Viser & Andrea Estes, Big Win for Brown, BOSTON.COM (Jan. 20, 2010), http://
www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/01/20/republican_trounces_coakley_
for_senate_imperils_obama_health_plan/.
51 Id.
52 Z. Byron Wolf et al., Scott Brown Sworn in as 41st GOP Senator, Says Stimulus “Did
Not Create One New Job,” ABC NEWS.COM (Feb. 4, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
scott-brown-sworn-washington-welcomes-newest-republican-senator/story?id=9748675&sin
glePage=true#.Ubi6Mflkxvk.
53 See Public Option May Be Dropped from Final Health Care Bill, CNN.COM (Dec. 28,
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/28/health.care/index.html (discussing the
plans for a House-Senate conference committee to “begin negotiations . . . on merging health
care bills passed by the Democratic majorities in each chamber”).
54 Robert Pear, Wrinkle in Health Law Vexes Lawmakers’ Aides, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/us/politics/wrinkle-in-health-law-vexes-lawmak
ers-aides.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
55 Starting March 23, 2010, twenty-six states joined to sue the federal government and
challenge the ACA’s constitutionality. See Florida Complaint, supra note 2, at 1–4.  On July R
26, 2010, Matt Sissel and the Pacific Legal Foundation challenged the ACA’s constitutional-
ity. See Sissel Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 10.  On March 26, 2010, the Association R
of American Physicians and Surgeons challenged the ACA’s constitutionality. See Complaint
at 1, Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2012)
(No. 1:10-CV-00499-RMC) [hereinafter Ass’n of Am. Physicians Complaint].
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the ACA.56  This was not a new challenge; during congressional deliber-
ations on the bill, questions had been raised about its constitutionality.57
Congress, in its legislative findings, attempted to justify the bill as a valid
exercise of its Commerce Clause power.58  Despite President Obama
“absolutely reject[ing] [the] notion” that the individual mandate was a
tax increase,59 the government defended the individual mandate before
the Supreme Court as being authorized independently by both the com-
merce and taxing powers.60  In a decision that surprised many,61 the Su-
preme Court upheld the individual mandate under Congress’s taxing
power, with a majority of Justices making it clear that the mandate was
not constitutional under Congress’s Commerce Power.62  The Court’s de-
cision, however, left undecided other questions about the ACA’s consti-
tutionality—including whether the Act, with its individual mandate
penalty now considered a tax, properly originated in the House of Repre-
sentatives,63 as required by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution.64
56 See Florida Complaint, supra note 2, at 3–4; Ass’n of Am. Physicians Complaint, R
supra note 55, at 8–9, 13–14. R
57 156 CONG. REC. H1901, H1903 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (statements of Rep. Young,
and Rep. McClintock, respectively); see also 156 CONG. REC. H1829 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010)
(statement of Rep. Poe); Walter Williams, A Minority View: Constitutional Contempt,
TOWNHALL.COM (Nov. 11, 2009), http://townhall.com/columnists/walterewilliams/2009/11/11/
a_minority_view_constitutional_contempt/page/full.
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012) (“(A) The requirement regulates activity that is com-
mercial and economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when health
care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased. . . . (B) Health insurance and health
care services are a significant part of the national economy. . . . (E) The economy loses up to
$207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the uninsured.
By significantly reducing the number of the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce this economic cost.  (F) The cost of providing
uncompensated care to the uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008. . . . (G) 62 percent of all
personal bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses. . . . (H) Under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), the Public Health Service
Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and this Act, the Federal Government has a significant role in
regulating health insurance.  The requirement is an essential part of this larger regulation of
economic activity, and the absence of the requirement would undercut Federal regulation of
the health insurance market.”).
59 Jacqueline Klingebiel, Obama: Mandate Is Not a Tax, ABC NEWS.COM (Sept. 20,
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/09/obama-mandate-is-not-a-tax/.
60 Brief for Petitioners at 21, 52, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct.
604 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/01/11-398tsUnitedStates.filed_..pdf.
61 Anastasia Killian, NFIB v. Sebelius: When Is a Tax Not a Tax, and When Is It?,
FORBES.COM (June 28, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2012/06/28/nfib-v-sebelius-
when-is-a-tax-not-a-tax-and-when-is-it/.
62 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587–91, 2594, 2600, 2608
(2012); id. at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
63 See generally id.; Sissel Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 6. R
64 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
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II. IS THE ACA A DIRECT ORIGINATION CLAUSE VIOLATION:
TRADITIONAL ORIGINATION CLAUSE INQUIRIES
Only a handful of Origination Clause challenges have made it to the
Supreme Court.65  The disposition of those cases has rested on two key
questions: (1) is the challenged act actually a “bill[ ] for raising
[r]evenue”66 that triggers the Origination Clause’s requirements;67 and
(2) were the Senate amendments, adding revenue-raising provisions to a
House bill, permissible under the Origination Clause?68  This Part will
look at each of these questions with respect to the ACA.69
A. Is the ACA a Bill for Raising Revenue?
While the Constitution requires “bills for raising [r]evenue” to origi-
nate in the House of Representatives, it gives no guidance as to what
constitutes a bill for raising revenue.70  The Supreme Court first inter-
preted the Origination Clause by analogy in the 1875 case United States
v. Norton.71  The Court noted that the Clause’s construction was “practi-
cally well settled by the uniform action of Congress,”72 and “that con-
struction” had defined the Clause as applying “‘to bills to levy taxes in
the strict sense of the words, and has not been understood to extend to
65 See Kysar, supra note 10, at 673; United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990); R
Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911);
Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906); Twin City Nat’l Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196
(1897); Lumberman’s Bank v. Huston, 167 U.S. 203 (1897); United States v. Norton, 91 U.S.
566 (1875) (however, see note 10 explaining that Norton is not technically an Origination R
Clause case).
66 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
67 See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385; Millard, 202 U.S. 429; Twin City Nat’l. Bank, 167
U.S. 196; Lumberman’s Bank, 167 U.S. 203; see also Norton, 91 U.S. 566.
68 See Rainey, 232 U.S. 310; Flint, 220 U.S. 107.
69 Pacific Legal Foundation, in its brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, specifically states the disputed issue as whether the individual
mandate violates the Origination Clause.  Brief of Appellant at 1, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:10-CV-01263-BAH),
aff’d, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  However, as one of the amici pointed out, the Origination
Clause applies to “discrete sections and amendments.”  Amicus Curiae Brief of Ass’n of Am.
Physicians & Surgeons in Support of Appellant and Reversal at 7, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. No. 13-5202 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Twin City Nat’l Bank, 167 U.S.
at 203 (“There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be
applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government.”)).  Although there were
undoubtedly parts of the ACA that were not bills for raising revenue under the Origination
Clause, and thus would not have needed to originate in the House, there are several provisions
in addition to the individual mandate that could raise Origination Clause concerns.  Therefore,
I will use the broader term ACA in this article.
70 JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31399, THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE OF
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT 3 (2011).
71 Norton, 91 U.S. 566; see also Kysar, supra note 10, at 674. R
72 Norton, 91 U.S. at 569.
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bills for other purposes which incidentally create revenue.’”73  This un-
derstanding was affirmed, according to the Court, by an 1813 circuit de-
cision by Justice Story in which he interpreted the term “revenue laws”
in an act to mean “such laws as are made for the direct and avowed
purpose for creating and securing revenue or public funds for the service
of the government,” but excluded laws “whose collateral and indirect
operation . . . within the scope of the provision” may “possibly conduce
to the public or fiscal wealth.”74
Applying these principles in later cases, the Court held in Twin City
National Bank v. Nebeker75 that an act creating a national currency se-
cured by U.S. bonds, while at the same time imposing a tax on certain
bank notes, was not a bill for raising revenue because tax went to “effec-
tually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency,”
rather than to “raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or
obligations of the Government.”76  The money was designed to support
the currency program and did not go into the general treasury.77
Likewise, in Millard v. Roberts,78 the Court upheld against an Orig-
ination Clause challenge taxes an act imposed for improving railroads
and building a railroad station in the District of Columbia because the
taxes imposed by the act were “but means to the purposes provided by
the act,” with the money going to the railroad companies, not to the gen-
eral treasury.79  Combined, these decisions appear to define a bill for
raising revenue as one that raises funds for the general expenses of gov-
ernment, not for specific projects.  A decision of the U.S. Circuit Court
for the Southern District of New York, in holding that a raise in postal
rates was not a bill for raising revenue, also demonstrated this principle:
Certain legislative measures are unmistakably bills for
raising revenue.  These impose taxes upon the people,
either directly or indirectly, or lay duties, imposts or ex-
cises, for the use of the government, and give to the per-
sons from whom the money is exacted no equivalent in
return, unless in the enjoyment, in common with the rest
of the citizens of the benefit of good government.  It is
this feature which characterizes bills for raising revenue.
73 Id. (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 877, 880 (1833)).
74 United States v. Mayo, 26 F. Cas. 1230, 1231 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 15,755); see
also Norton, 91 U.S. at 569.
75 Twin City Nat’l Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897).
76 Id. at 203.
77 Id. at 198–99, 203; see also Kysar, supra note 10, at 675. R
78 Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906).
79 Id. at 437.
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They draw money from the citizen; they give no direct
equivalent in return.80
The reason for treating bills for raising revenue differently and requiring
them to originate in the House, said the court, was because members of
the House were “immediate[ly] responsib[le] to their constituents” and
“their jealous regard for the pecuniary interests of the people, it was sup-
posed, would render them especially watchful in the protection of those
whom they represented.”81
More recently, in United States v. Munoz-Flores,82 the Court af-
firmed its past precedents, noting that statutes that create governmental
programs and raise revenue to support those programs are not bills for
raising revenue.83  Rather, that definition is reserved for bills that
“raise[ ] revenue to support Government generally.”84  In analyzing the
program at question in that case—a requirement that courts impose a
special assessment on persons convicted of federal misdemeanors, to be
deposited into the Crime Victims Fund85—the Court said that Congress
“anticipated that ‘substantial amounts [would] not result’ from that
source of funds.”86  While any excess from the Crime Victims Fund
would go into the general treasury, the revenues from the special assess-
ment made up only four percent of the Crime Victims Fund, and Con-
gress did not anticipate, nor did there actually materialize, any sort of
substantial excess from the Fund.87
Given the Supreme Court’s precedents, would the ACA fall under
the definition of a “bill for raising revenue”?  In National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), both the Government’s brief
and the Court’s opinion recognized that the individual mandate provision
of the ACA would raise significant revenues—approximately $4 billion a
year starting in 2017,88 and the money would go into the general trea-
sury.89  Additionally, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Adminis-
80 United States ex rel. Michels v. James, 26 F. Cas. 577, 578 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No.
15,464).
81 Id.
82 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
83 Id. at 398.
84 Id.  In United States v. Munoz-Flores, the Court indicated, in response to an argument
raised by Munoz-Flores, that too much attenuation between a payor and a program may factor
into whether a particular bill is a revenue-raising bill. Id. at 408 n.7.
85 Id. at 387, 398.
86 Id. at 399 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-497, at 13–14 (1984)).
87 Id.
88 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012); see also Brief
for Petitioners at 54, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2012) (No.
11-398).
89 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (“The ‘[s]hared responsibility payment,’ as the statute
entitles it, is paid into the Treasury by ‘taxpayer[s]’ when they file their tax returns.” (altera-
tion in original) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b))).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-3\CJP302.txt unknown Seq: 13  2-APR-15 9:25
2015] THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE 463
tration stated that the ACA90 includes “$438 billion worth of revenue
provisions in the form of new taxes and fees”91 and amounts to “the
largest set of tax law changes in 20 years.”92  A 2012 letter from the
Congressional Budget Office to Speaker of the House John Boehner on
how proposed legislation to repeal the ACA93 would affect government
spending and revenue noted that the following revenue losses over the
ten year period of 2013 to 2022 if the ACA were repealed: $55 billion for
the individual mandate penalty; $117 billion for the employer mandate
penalty; $111 billion for the “excise tax on high-premium insurance
plans”; $223 billion in other changes on tax revenues mostly associated
with “shifts in the mix of taxable and nontaxable compensation”; $318
billion from the Hospital Insurance payroll tax rate hike; $102 billion
from the fee on health insurance providers; $34 billion for a fee on cer-
tain drug manufacturers and importers; $29 billion for a fee on certain
medical device manufacturers and importers; and $24 billion for repeal-
ing the limit on pre-tax contributions to flexible spending accounts.94
Despite recognizing the revenue aspects of the individual mandate
in its briefing before the Supreme Court,95 in its motion to dismiss in the
Pacific Legal Foundation case, and in its appellate briefing, the Govern-
ment asserted that the ACA was not a bill for raising revenue because
“the Origination Clause applies only if generating revenue is the legisla-
tion’s key purpose.”96  The key to this argument was the Government’s
attempt to draw a clear distinction between the taxing power, which per-
mits Congress to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,”97
90 In writing its report and for purposes of the numbers provided in the report, the Trea-
sury Inspector General for Tax Administration looked at both H.R. 3590 and the Health Care
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, referring to
the two acts collectively as the “ACA.” TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN.,
2011-20-105, THE MODERNIZATION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES ORGANIZATION
IS EFFECTIVELY PLANNING FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1
(2011).
91 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 90, at 1. R
92 Id.
93 For purposes of the letter and the numbers provided in the letter, the Congressional
Budget Office looked at both H.R. 3590 and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, referring to the two acts collectively as the
“ACA.”  Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to John
Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1 n.1 (July 24, 2012), available at http://
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43471-hr6079.pdf.
94 Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, supra note 93, at 9–10, 17. R
95 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 88, at 52–56. R
96 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 7, Sissel v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:10-CV-01263-
BAH) [hereinafter Sissel Defendant Motion to Dismiss], aff’d, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
The Government raised a similar argument before the District of Columbia Circuit in its appel-
late brief.  Brief of Appellees at 9–14, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 760
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5202).
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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and the Origination Clause, which applies to “[b]ills for raising
[r]evenue.”98  Therefore, even bills enacted pursuant to Congress’s
power to tax under the Spending Clause need not originate in the House
if raising revenue was “incidental to the overall purpose of the statute.”99
According to the Government, the purpose of the ACA was to “improve
the nation’s health care system by reforming insurance markets, reducing
the number of Americans without health coverage, and controlling
costs.”100  Thus, Congress did not design the revenue generating provi-
sions in an attempt to meet governmental expenses; rather, the provisions
were designed to accomplish the ACA’s purposes.101  Furthermore, the
Government pointed to the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB, in which
the Court stated, “‘[a]lthough the payment will raise considerable reve-
nue, it is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage.’”102
The Government’s argument, however, rests on an overly broad
reading of the Supreme Court’s Origination Clause decisions.  The Su-
preme Court never stated that generating revenue must be the “key pur-
pose” of the challenged act; rather, it pointed out that the Origination
Clause does not apply to bills that “incidentally” raise revenue.103  The
Court has further clarified, as shown by Twin City National Bank v. Ne-
beker, Millard v. Roberts, and United States v. Munoz-Flores, that the
fact that a tax goes into the general treasury signifies that it does not
“incidentally” raise revenue.104 The individual mandate and other reve-
nue-raising provisions of the ACA are not incidental or insubstantial;
rather, the provisions raise significant revenue for the Government,
amount to significant changes to the tax code, and fund the general
treasury.105
Additionally, if a particular act is only deemed to be within Con-
gress’s power to pass because it was passed under the taxing power, then
the argument could be made that the purpose of the act was to create
revenue and that the revenue-raising provisions are not “incidental” to
the bill.106  Because the Supreme Court held that the individual mandate
98 Id. § 7; Sissel Defendant Motion to Dismiss, supra note 96, at 8. R
99 Sissel Defendant Motion to Dismiss, supra note 96, at 8. R
100 Id. at 9–10.
101 Id. at 9.
102 Id. (alteration in original).
103 United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569 (1875).
104 See supra notes 71–87 and accompanying text; see also Kysar, supra note 10, at 674. R
However, there was the possibility in Munoz-Flores of a small amount of money going into the
General Treasury, and that program was still considered “incidental.” See United States v.
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 399 (1990).
105 See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text. R
106 Plaintiff Matt Sissel’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 14–19, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:10-CV-01263-BAH)
[hereinafter Sissel Opposition to Motion to Dismiss], aff’d, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
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may only be justified as a valid use of Congress’s taxing power as op-
posed to any other congressional power under Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, the purpose of at least part of the ACA must be to create
revenue.107
This appears to be the argument that Pacific Legal Foundation made
in its opposition to the motion to dismiss in Sissel v. United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services.108  According to Pacific Legal
Foundation, “[W]here a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax[ing
power], and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exer-
cise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising reve-
nue . . . .”109  Thus, there are two classes of tax laws under the
Origination Clause—those that raise revenue and must originate in the
House, and “those that are ‘bills for other purposes which may inciden-
tally create revenue.’”110  This second group of laws includes those in
which Congress passes a tax, penalty, or fee as a means to “enforce a
statute passed under some other enumerated power.”111  Pacific Legal
Foundation cited several cases as examples of this second type of law,
including Twin City National Bank v. Nebeker (passed pursuant to Con-
gress’s interstate commerce power),112 United States v. Norton (also
passed pursuant to Congress’s commerce power),113 Millard v. Roberts
(passed pursuant to Congress’s power over the District of Columbia),114
and Munoz-Flores v. United States (part of Congress’s power to control
practice and procedure in federal courts, which is incidental to its power
to create lower federal courts under Article III).115
Timothy Sandefur, So It’s a Tax, Now What?: Some of the Problems Remaining After NFIB v.
Sebelius, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 203, 232–34 (2013).
107 Sandefur, supra note 106, at 232–34. R
108 Sissel Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 106, at 14–19; see also Sandefur, R
supra note 106, at 232–34. R
109 Sissel Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 106, at 15. R
110 Id. at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat’l Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897)).
111 Id..
112 Twin City Nat’l Bank, 167 U.S. 196; Sissel Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 106, at 15. R
113 United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566 (1875); Sissel Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 106, at 15. R
114 Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906); Sissel Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 106, at 15. R
115 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 398 (1990).  Pacific Legal Foundation
claims that the provision in Munoz-Flores was enacted pursuant to Congress’s “law-enforce-
ment powers.”  Sissel Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 106, at 15.  However, I do R
not agree that the Constitution gives to Congress a general “law-enforcement power.”  In their
corrected reply brief before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Pacific
Legal Foundation states that the program authorized in Munoz-Flores was enacted pursuant to
Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  Corrected Reply Brief of Appellant at 7, Sissel v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:10-CV-01263-
BAH), aff’d, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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Lower federal court opinions also confirm this point.  A federal dis-
trict court, in upholding federal milk price support systems, noted that
the Origination Clause “does not invalidate those revenue raising ‘impo-
sitions made incidentally under the commerce clause . . ., as a means of
constraining and regulating.’”116  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit also up-
held the milk price support system, explaining that assessments are a
permissible way to regulate commerce.117  Because the “clear language
and structure” of the amendment authorizing the collection had the pri-
mary purpose of regulating commerce, the program was constitutionally
permitted under the commerce power, not the taxing power.118  The
Sixth Circuit held penalty provisions under the Agriculture Adjustment
Act of 1938 to be a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, not-
ing that a test for determining when Congress was using its commerce or
taxing power was
to view the objects and purposes of the statute as a
whole and if from such examination it is concluded that
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation merely in-
cidental, the imposition is a tax and is controlled by the
taxing provisions of the Constitution.  Conversely, if
regulation is the primary purpose of the statute, the mere
fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not
make the imposition a tax, but a sanction imposed for
the purpose of making effective the congressional
enactment.119
All of these cases draw a distinction between acts passed for a certain
regulatory purpose and supported by Congress’s Commerce Power, and
acts passed pursuant to Congress’s taxing power.120
The fact that the ACA has some sort of regulatory effect—encour-
aging individuals to maintain qualifying health insurance—does not pre-
vent it from being a tax passed pursuant to Congress’s taxing power.121
The Supreme Court has made clear that all taxes are, to some degree,
regulatory in that they “interpose[ ] an economic impediment to the ac-
tivity taxed as compared with others not taxed.”122  However,
[A] tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regula-
tory effect . . . and it has long been established that an
116 Mulroy v. Block, 569 F. Supp. 256, 265 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting United States v.
Stangland, 242 F.2d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1957)).
117 South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir. 1983).
118 Id. at 887–88.
119 Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 994 (6th Cir. 1943).
120 See Sandefur, supra note 106, at 232–34. R
121 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 (2012).
122 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
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Act of Congress which on its face purports to be an exer-
cise of the taxing power is not any the less so because
the tax is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the
thing taxed.123
Congress’s designation of the challenged provision as a tax is not even
necessary for a particular act to be deemed a valid exercise of Congress’s
taxing power.124  Furthermore, as Chief Justice Roberts noted in NFIB,
the individual mandate provision in the ACA “looks like a tax in many
respects”—it is codified in the Internal Revenue Code and collected by
the IRS; it is paid by taxpayers when they file their income tax returns; it
does not apply to people whose household income is too low to meet the
IRS’s filing threshold; and the payment amount is determined by tax-
related factors like “taxable income, number of dependents, and joint fil-
ing status.”125
The Government’s attempt to distinguish between acts passed pur-
suant to Congress’s taxing power and bills for raising revenue under the
Origination Clause does not change this analysis.126  When one examines
the meaning of the words “revenue” and “tax,” this supposed distinction
between the scope of the taxing power and the Origination Clause seems
a bit forced.  Although James Madison was not a proponent of the Origi-
nation Clause,127 he made clear in Federalist 58 that taxes must originate
in the House of Representatives, explaining that it was the House of Rep-
resentatives that
alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support
of the government.  They, in a word, hold the purse . . . .
This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as
the most complete and effectual weapon with which any
constitution can arm the immediate representatives of
the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance,
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary
measure.128
123 Id.; see also Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2596 (“Although the payment will raise considera-
ble revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage.  But taxes that seek to
influence conduct are nothing new.  Some of our earliest federal taxes sought to deter the
purchase of imported manufactured goods in order to foster the growth of domestic
industry.”).
124 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594–95.
125 Id. at 2594.
126 Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint at 7–8, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d
159 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:10-CV-01263-BAH) [hereinafter Sissel Defendant Reply Memoran-
dum], aff’d, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
127 See infra note 266 and accompanying text. R
128 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
histdox/fed_58.html.
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Additionally, although not contemporaneous with the founding, Web-
ster’s 1828 dictionary defined “revenue” as including “[t]he annual pro-
duce of taxes, excise, customs, duties, rents, [etc.] which a nation or state
collects and receives into the treasury for public use.”129  “Tax” was de-
fined in part as a noun meaning
[a] rate or sum of money assessed on the person or prop-
erty of a citizen by government, for the use of the nation
or state. . . . Tax is a term of general import, including
almost every species of imposition on persons or prop-
erty for supplying the public treasury, as tolls, tribute,
subsidy, excise, impost, or customs.  But more generally,
tax is limited to the sum laid upon polls, lands, houses,
horses, cattle, professions and occupations.130
As a verb, “tax” was defined as “[t]o lay, impose or assess upon citizens
a certain sum of money or amount of property, to be paid to the public
treasury, or to the treasury of a corporation or company, to defray the
expenses of the government or corporation, [etc.].”131  An even later
source, the first edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, defined “revenue”
this way: “As applied to the income of a government, . . . [as] a broad
and general term, including all public moneys which the state collects
and receives, from whatever source and in whatever manner.”132  Black’s
defined “taxation” as “[t]he imposition of a tax; the act or process of
imposing and levying a pecuniary charge or enforced contribu-
tion, . . . for the purpose of providing revenue for the maintenance and
expenses of government.”133  These definitions seem to comport with the
argument that bills passed under Congress’s taxing power are bills for
raising revenue.
Finally, this view that bills passed under Congress’s taxing power
are bills for raising revenue was also expressed in a 1905 debate over a
Senate bill imposing a tax on certain bonds to be paid by banking as-
sociations, apparently to help pay to build the Panama Canal.134  In the
House, the provision was challenged as violating the Origination
Clause.135  The House passed its own bill, and a conference committee
129 2 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 58 (1st ed. 1828), available at http://archive.org/stream/
americandictiona02websrich#page/n476/mode/1up.
130 Id. at 90.
131 Id.
132 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1040 (1st ed. 1891), available at http://blacks.worldfree
mansociety.org/1/R/r-1040.jpg.
133 Id. at 1154.
134 2 ASHER C. HINDS, HIND’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 1494
(Government Printing Office 1907).
135 Id.
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was formed.136  In arguing that the Senate bill was not a bill for raising
revenue, Wisconsin Senator James C. Spooner,137 an attorney who had
turned down the position of Attorney General in President McKinley’s
administration,138 stated that the term “revenue laws” “embraces clearly
all bills passed in the exercise of the taxing power . . . for the purpose of
raising money for the support of the Government.”139  However, he said,
the definition did not include, nor was it intended to include, “bills
passed in the exercise of constitutional powers other than the taxing
power, even if they operated to raise revenue, or even if they imposed
incidentally a tax or taxes to secure the more efficient and successful
exercise of the power.”140
The district court in Pacific Legal Foundation’s challenge rejected
the argument that the ACA was a revenue-raising bill, finding the indi-
vidual mandate to be designed for the purpose of expanding health care
coverage; thus, any revenue raised was “merely incidental.”141  Although
the court recognized that the individual mandate revenues “do not sup-
port a ‘particular governmental program,’” the court said that the reve-
nues were not raised to generally support the government, as the
government would have preferred to raise zero revenues under the indi-
vidual mandate and instead obtain universal health insurance cover-
age.142  The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit agreed, finding that the purpose of the statute was to increase
health care coverage and not to raise revenue, and that any revenue
raised is incidental to the ACA’s primary purpose.143  Whether the Su-
preme Court will formally adopt this argument, however, is another mat-
ter.  Its opinions seem to focus on the destination of the funds in
ascertaining the purpose of the particular tax.144  Additionally, its opin-
ions and those of lower courts seem to recognize a dichotomy between
regulatory penalties and fees enacted pursuant to some other congres-
sional power (often the Commerce Clause), and the power to enact a tax
under Congress’s taxing power.145  If the Court follows this reasoning,
then the ACA would be a bill for raising revenue.  However, the Court’s
track record in Origination Clause cases has been to narrowly interpret
136 Id. §§ 1489, 1494.
137 Id.
138 Spooner, John Coit, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000741 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
139 2 HINDS, supra note 134, §§ 1489, 1494. R
140 Id. §§ 1489, 1494.
141 Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 159, 167–170
(D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
142 Id. at 168.
143 Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 760 F.3d 1, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
144 See infra notes 75–94 and accompanying text. R
145 See infra notes 107–116 and accompanying text. R
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the Origination Clause, so it seems unlikely that the Court would change
its approach now.  Furthermore, even if the Court did recognize the ACA
as a bill for raising revenue under this or another theory, the Govern-
ment’s argument is that the ACA originated in the House.146  This argu-
ment raises the second important question for direct Origination Clause
inquiries—what is the scope of the Senate’s power to add revenue-rais-
ing provisions by amendment?
B. Can the Senate Add Revenue Provisions to a House Bill Under
the Origination Clause?
A second often-litigated Origination Clause question is the scope of
the Senate’s power to amend House revenue bills or even to add revenue
provisions to properly-passed House bills.  Although early drafts of the
Origination Clause prohibited the Senate from amending revenue-raising
bills,147 the final version of the Clause that was ratified in the Constitu-
tion permits the Senate to “propose or concur with Amendments as on
other Bills.”148  While this may seem to be a very broad power that
would permit any type of amendment, the Supreme Court has read a few
restrictions into the Senate’s amendment power under the Origination
Clause.
In Flint v. Stone,149 the Supreme Court held that a Senate amend-
ment replacing an inheritance tax in a House bill with a corporation tax
did not violate the Origination Clause.150  The Court simply noted that
the bill “properly originated in the House” and that “[t]he amendment
was germane to the subject-matter of the bill, and not beyond the power
of the Senate to propose.”151  A few years later in Rainey v. United
States,152 the Court upheld a tax added by the Senate to a House bill
because the provision was added “as an amendment to a bill for raising
revenue which originated in the House.”153  Despite the Flint Court’s
146 Sissel Defendant Motion to Dismiss, supra note 96, at 5–6. R
147 See infra notes 244–71 and accompanying text. R
148 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
149 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
150 Id. at 143.
151 Id.
152 232 U.S. 310 (1914).
153 Id. at 317.  The dispute in Rainey was over an excise tax on foreign-built pleasure
yachts that was added by the Senate to the House tariff bill which became the Tariff Act of
1909. Id. at 315.  Introduced on March 17, 1909, by Congressman Serano Payne, chairman of
the House Ways and Means Committee, this bill originated in a special session of Congress
called by President Taft for the explicit purpose of passing new tariff legislation. Tariff Mea-
sure Is Finally Passed, Corrected and Signed—Congress Ends Its Session, N.Y. TIMES, Au-
gust 6, 1909, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9805E3D6143DE733A257
55C0A96E9C946897D6CF.  The bill was introduced in the House as “[a] bill . . . to provide
revenue, equalize duties, and encourage the industries of the United States, and for other pur-
poses.”  44 CONG. REC. 65 (1909).
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consideration of germaneness, because the bill had “become an enrolled
and duly authenticated Act of Congress,” the Rainey Court refused to
consider whether the amendment was outside the original bill’s pur-
pose.154  Furthermore, although the Court in both Flint and Rainey indi-
cated that it would not look past an enrolled bill to determine if the bill
was properly enacted,155 in Munoz-Flores, the Court rejected the Gov-
ernment’s argument that “the House’s passage of a bill conclusively es-
tablishes that the House has determined either that the bill is not a
revenue bill or that it originated in the House.”156  Contrary to the Gov-
ernment’s argument, the Court did not believe that its review of the con-
stitutionality of an act under the Origination Clause showed a “‘lack of
respect’ for Congress’[s] judgment” under the political question
doctrine.157
The Senate’s ability to amend House revenue bills has also been a
source of controversy between the House and Senate.158  For example, in
1871, the House agreed to a resolution directing the Committee on Rules
to examine the constitutionality of the Senate’s practice of adding non-
germane amendments to bills for raising revenue and to consider
“whether any further rules or proceedings are needed to preserve the
privileges of the House.”159  Although it does not appear that the Com-
mittee reported on its findings, a year later the House Ways and Means
Committee reported a resolution that was ultimately approved directing
the clerk to send back to the Senate, pursuant to the Origination Clause, a
bill that originally addressed repealing coffee and tea duties but was
amended to reduce taxes on other things.160  During the lengthy House
debates on the resolution, then-Representative James A. Garfield argued
for a germaneness rule, stating that the Senate’s power to amend House
revenue bills should be “limited to the subject-matter of the bill.”161
When the Senate received the resolution, the Senate referred the issue to
its Committee on Privileges and Elections, which issued a report outlin-
ing a much broader right of the Senate to amend, but acknowledging that
the Senate could not add revenue-raising amendments to any House bill,
“but only to a bill raising revenue.”162
154 Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317.
155 Rainey, 232 U.S. at 316; Flint, 220 U.S. at 143.
156 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 390 (1990).
157 Id. at 390–94.
158 See SATURNO, supra note 70, at, 5–7 (2011). R
159 2 HINDS, supra note 134, § 1489. R
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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Pacific Legal Foundation advanced this argument in its lawsuit,163
claiming first in its opposition to the motion to dismiss that the individual
mandate originated in the Senate because the Senate deleted and com-
pletely replaced the language in the Service Members Home Ownership
Tax Act of 2009 with the language of the ACA.164  While there have
been several instances in which courts have permitted the Senate to de-
lete and replace a bill with its own revenue-raising bill, those were in-
stances in which the original House bill was a bill for raising revenue.165
According to Pacific Legal Foundation, “it is undisputed that H.R. 3590
was not originally a bill for raising revenue.”166  Pacific Legal Founda-
tion also argued that the Senate amendment was improper because it was
not germane to the original bill.167  At the district court level, the ger-
maneness argument seemed to circle back to the first argument, that the
original House bill was not a bill for raising revenue,168 while at the
appellate level Pacific Legal Foundation also contended that the amend-
ment was not germane because the original House bill had nothing to do
with reforming health insurance.169
The Government did, however, dispute the claim that the Service
Members Home Ownership Tax Act was not a bill for raising revenue,
noting that “every provision” of the bill concerned collecting revenue.170
Not only did the original bill contain tax provisions related to home
purchases by certain members of the military, it also increased estimated
tax payments for certain corporations.171  The district court agreed with
the Government’s analysis, and the circuit court did not address it.172
With respect to the germaneness question, the Government cited to
Rainey for the proposition that it is the prerogative of the House and
Senate to determine the appropriateness of an amendment, not the
courts.173  The circuit court did not address this issue in its opinion.174
The original H.R. 3590 does initially appear to be a bill for raising
revenue.  Although the bill’s second, third, and fourth provisions would
163 Sissel Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 11–12. R
164 Sissel Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 106, at 9–10. R
165 Id. at 10.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 10–12.
168 Id.
169 See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 21, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs.,760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5202).
170 Sissel Defendant Reply Memorandum, supra note 126, at 9. R
171 Id. at 9–10.
172 Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 159, 167–69 (D.D.C.
2013); Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
173 Brief for the Appellees at 17, Sissel, 760 F.3d 1 (No. 13-5202).  The Government also
noted that Pacific Legal Foundation’s reliance on Munoz-Flores was inapposite, since that case
did not overrule Rainey, rather it noted that Origination Clause cases are justiciable. Id. at 18.
174 Sissel, 760 F.3d 1.
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decrease revenue through tax credits, excluding certain funds from in-
come, and waiving recapture of the tax credit for certain persons who sell
their homes,175 the bill’s fifth and sixth sections, which concern corpo-
rate taxes and penalties, appear to raise government revenue.176  Accord-
ing to members of Congress, however, those provisions were added to
pay for the other provisions of the bill that cost the government
money.177  A Republican summary of the bill noted,
To offset the cost of the legislation, the bill increases the
penalties for failure to file a partnership or S-corporation
return from $89 to $110, beginning in taxable years fol-
lowing December 31, 2009.  H.R. 3590 also increases by
half percentage point—to 100.75 percent—the amount
of any required installment of corporate estimated tax
which is otherwise due in July, August, or September
2014.178
Additionally, during the House debates on the bill, several representa-
tives noted that the bill would not cost the government money.179  Thus,
the corporate tax provisions are merely a way of meeting, on paper, the
175 Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. §§ 2–4
(as introduced in the House, Sept. 17, 2009).  In its motion to dismiss at the district court, the
Government claimed that it did not matter that parts of the bill sought to decrease taxes.  Sissel
Defendant Motion to Dismiss, supra note 96, at 10 (“‘[O]nce a revenue bill has been initiated R
in the House, the Senate is fully empowered to propose amendments, even if their effect will
be to transform a proposal lowering taxes [ ] into one raising taxes.’” (quoting Armstrong v.
Untied States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1381–82 (9th Cir. 1985))).  However, that does not answer the
question of whether a tax credit amounts to a bill for raising revenue.  Professor Kysar argues
that Pacific Legal Foundation would have had a more convincing argument that the ACA
violates the Origination Clause had it argued that the Clause only applied to “revenue-increas-
ing measure.”  Kysar, supra note 10, at 718. R
176 H.R. 3590 §§ 5–6.
177 See Luke Mullins, House Votes to Extend First-Time Home Buyer Tax Credit for
Service Members, US NEWS.COM (Oct. 8, 2009), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-
home-front/2009/10/08/house-votes-to-extend-first-time-home-buyer-tax-credit-for-service-
members; Legislative Digest: H.R. 3590, Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009,
GOP.GOV (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.gop.gov/bill/h-r-3590-service-members-home-owner-
ship-tax-act-of-2009/ [hereinafter Legislative Digest: H.R. 3590].  Several members of the
House of Representatives filed an amicus brief at the District of Columbia Circuit in the Sissel
case.  Brief of Rep. Trent Franks et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant’s Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, Sissel, 760 F.3d 1 (No. 13-5202).  In the brief, the House members point
out that the corporate tax provision was a “withholding modification that [did not] raise reve-
nue or tax rates, but merely collect[ed] a small amount more than may otherwise be due, which
amount may be refunded or adjusted once the corporation files its annual return.” Id. at 24
n.29 (citing Baral v. United States, 528 U.S. 431, 436 (2000) for the proposition that “With-
holding and estimated tax remittances are not taxes in their own right, but methods for collect-
ing the income tax.”)
178 Legislative Digest: H.R. 3590, supra note 177. R
179 155 CONG. REC. H10,553 (Oct. 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. Etheridge, noting that the
bill is paid for); 155 CONG. REC. H10,552 (Oct. 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. Kind, noting that
the bill is paid for and “will not add a nickel to our national deficit”); 155 CONG. REC. H10,551
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PAYGO requirement to achieve “revenue neutrality.”180  Companies
subject to the tax increase in 2014 “would receive an offsetting tax re-
duction in 2015.”181
Thus, it would appear that under the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Origination Clause, the revenue-raising provisions of the original
H.R. 3590 were designed to, on paper, make the Service Members Home
Ownership Tax Act of 2009 revenue neutral—not to raise money for the
operation of the government in general, or really raise any revenue at all.
This understanding of the Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act
raises doubts as to whether it would be considered a revenue-raising bill
for purposes of the Origination Clause, calling into question the constitu-
tionality of the Senate’s amendments to that bill if the ACA is deemed a
revenue-raising bill under the Court’s jurisprudence.
Although the Supreme Court’s Origination Clause precedents could
reasonably be read broadly to hold that the ACA directly violates the
Origination Clause, such an outcome seems unlikely for several reasons.
First, the Court has never held a law unconstitutional under the Origina-
tion Clause.182  The Court has been wary of strictly enforcing the Origi-
nation Clause and appears implicitly to defer to Congress.  There is no
reason to think that the current Court would take a more robust approach
to enforcing the Clause than previous Courts have taken.  In fact, Justice
Scalia, one of the four dissenters in NFIB, argued in Munoz-Flores that
Congress should have the final word on where a bill originated, noting
that the designation of a bill as a House bill “attests that the legislation
originated in the House.”183  Second, the Court has already gone out of
its way to uphold the ACA in NFIB—adopting a reading of the statute
that many found surprising.184  It seems unlikely that a majority of the
Court (especially given Justice Scalia’s views) would now hold that the
ACA violates a constitutional provision that the Court has routinely been
reluctant to enforce vigorously.  Under the traditional approach the Court
takes to the Origination Clause, the Clause has been rendered meaning-
less if it permits the Senate to delete and replace a House bill and fails to
(Oct. 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. Tanner, noting that the bill is “fully paid for”); 155 CONG.
REC. E2459 (Oct. 6, 2009) (statement of Rep. Green noting that the act is “deficit neutral”).
180 Legislative Digest: H.R. 3590, supra note 177. R
181 Id.
182 See supra note 10. R
183 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 409 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
184 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Randy E. Barnett, No
Small Feat: Who Won the Obamacare Case (and Why Did So Many Law Professors Miss the
Boat)? 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331 (2013).  Barnett noted that 85% of experts polled by the Ameri-
can Bar Association believed that the individual mandate would be upheld, and even those
who thought it could be upheld under the tax power still believe it to be constitutional under
the Commerce Clause.  He believes that so many professors were wrong because they “never
properly understood the New Federalism of the Rehnquist Court.”
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treat a bill enacted solely under Congress’s taxing power that raises con-
siderable revenue as a bill for raising revenue.
III. A DIFFERENT APPROACH: INDIRECT CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Assuming the ACA is a bill for raising revenue subject to the Origi-
nation Clause, there is another approach that the Court could take that
would give meaning and purpose to the Origination Clause.  This ap-
proach is based on the Court’s reasoning in cases in which it has pro-
tected compromises embodied in the Constitution that were the source of
great debate at the constitutional convention from being easily displaced
or ignored by Congress or the states.185  This includes protecting such
provisions from indirect violations—from attempts to circumvent the
constitutional guarantee.186  In Part A, I will outline the Court’s approach
to indirect constitutional violations in Term Limits and Clinton v. City of
New York.  I will then look at whether the Origination Clause is the type
of constitutional provision that should fall under the Court’s indirect con-
stitutional violation analysis.  Finally, I will consider what indirect con-
stitutional violations occurred in the passage of the ACA.
A. Indirect Constitutional Violations Cases
1. United States Term Limits v. Thornton
In United States Term Limits v. Thornton, the Court held that sec-
tion 3 of Arkansas’s Amendment 73, which prohibited members of Con-
gress who had served a certain number of terms from appearing on the
ballot, was unconstitutional under the Qualification Clauses.187  The
Court started its analysis with a thorough review of its previous decision
in Powell v. McCormack,188 in which it held that Congress lacked the
power to add qualifications for serving in Congress, other than those set
out in the Qualifications Clauses.189 Powell, much like Term Limits,
could be characterized as an indirect constitutional violation case.  Al-
though Adam Clayton Powell had been properly elected to Congress and
met the qualifications set out in the Qualifications Clause, the House
decided, with the key vote needing only a majority to pass, to exclude
Powell from that body due to alleged misconduct.190  After reviewing the
pre-convention precedents, the constitutional convention debates and
185 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995); see also Tara Ross, Federalism & Separation of Powers,
ENGAGE, Sept. 2010, at 37 (2010).
186 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 829.
187 Id. at 836.
188 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
189 U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 787; see also Powell, 395 U.S. 486.
190 Powell, 395 U.S. at 553–54.  The Constitution permits the House or Senate to “expel a
Member” by a vote of two-thirds of its members.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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post-convention ratifying debates, the post-ratification history, and “the
basic principles of our democratic system,” the Court concluded that
Powell was improperly excluded and that Congress, in judging its mem-
bers qualifications, was limited to the qualifications set forth in the Con-
stitution.191  In essence, the power given to the House in Article I,
Section 5 of the Constitution to judge the qualifications of its members
did not allow the House to violate the Qualifications Clause of Article I,
Section 2 by adding qualifications.192
The Term Limits Court, after reaffirming its previous decision in
Powell, addressed whether the states had power to add to the qualifica-
tions for members of Congress.193  Although the Court found that the
states had no reserved power under the Tenth Amendment to add to con-
gressional qualifications, the Court went further and looked at whether, if
such a power existed, the framers, in intending the qualifications in the
Constitution to be exclusive, “divested” the states of any such power.194
Following the pattern set out in Powell, the Court looked at “the text and
structure of the Constitution, the relevant historical materials, and, most
importantly, the ‘basic principles of our democratic system’” to find that
states were precluded from adding qualifications.195  As part of its in-
quiry, the Court examined the constitutional convention and ratifying de-
bates; congressional experience, which it viewed as “‘erratic’” and of
limited precedential value;196 the views of learned commentators;197 and
state practice, which it also deemed to be of limited value.198
After determining that the states could not add to congressional
qualifications, the Court got to the heart of its indirect constitutional vio-
lation reasoning.  Amendment 73’s supporters had argued that the
Amendment was not a qualification—rather, it was simply a ballot ac-
cess restriction that prohibited candidates who had served too many
terms from appearing on the ballot, but did not prevent them from serv-
ing in Congress if they won a write-in election.199  The Court stated that
it need not decide if Amendment 73 was in fact a qualification, because
even if it was simply a ballot access provision it would be unconstitu-
tional.200  The Court explained that “Amendment 73 [wa]s an indirect
191 Powell, 395 U.S. at 548, 550.
192 The Court did not address any limits the Constitution placed on Congress’s power to
expel by a two-thirds vote any of its members in accordance with the Expulsion Clause. Pow-
ell, 395 U.S. at 558 n.27; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
193 U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 798–801.
194 Id. at 800–01.
195 Id. at 806.
196 Id. at 819 (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 545–46).
197 Id. at 799–800.
198 Id. at 823–26.
199 Id. at 787, 828.
200 Id. at 829.
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attempt to accomplish what the Constitution prohibits Arkansas from ac-
complishing directly,”201 and as such it could not stand.202  In rejecting
this argument, the Court used lofty language to highlight the importance
of the Qualifications Clauses in our constitutional structure.  For exam-
ple, the Court exclaimed that allowing the Amendment to survive as a
ballot access provision would “trivialize[ ] the basic principles of our
democracy that underlie” the Qualification Clause and treat it “not as the
embodiment of a grand principle, but rather as empty formalism.”203
Additionally, the Court found it “‘inconceivable that guaranties embed-
ded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out
of existence.’”204  While responding to an argument by the Amend-
ment’s supporters that would allow term limits under the Elections
Clause of Article I, Section 4,205 the Court pointed back to its decision in
Powell and the Framer’s concern about congressional aggrandizement,
and then “refuse[d] to adopt an interpretation of the Elections Clause that
would so cavalierly disregard what the Framers intended to be a funda-
mental constitutional safeguard.”206  Finally, the Court declared that pro-
tecting the constitutional “structure envisioned by the Framers” by
prohibiting the states from creating congressional qualifications results in
“a ‘more perfect Union.’”207  This grand language makes it appear that
our entire constitutional structure rests on protecting this safeguard from
direct and indirect challenges alike.
2. Clinton v. City of New York
The Court’s analysis of indirect constitutional violations in Clinton
v. City of New York is not as straightforward as in Term Limits, but it is
still present.  At issue in Clinton v. City of New York was President Clin-
ton’s decision to cancel certain provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 pursuant to authority granted to
him under the Line Item Veto Act.208  The Line Item Veto Act permitted
the President to cancel, within five days, certain provisions related to
spending, discretionary budget authority, or limited tax benefits that had
been enacted into law.209  The President was required to follow specific
201 Id.
202 Id. at 830.
203 Id. at 831.
204 Id. (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960)).
205 U.S. CONST. art. V, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of choosing Senators.”).
206 U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 832.
207 Id. at 838.
208 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 422–25 (1998).
209 Id. at 436.
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procedures in cancelling items, including ensuring that the cancellation
would “‘reduce the Federal budget deficit; . . . not impair any essential
Government functions; and . . . not harm the national interest.’”210  The
President was further required to notify Congress of the cancelation
within five days of the enactment of the canceled provision.211  Congress
could pass, by a majority vote of each body, a disapproval bill, which the
President could veto but not cancel.212  New York City, among others,
challenged the constitutionality of Clinton’s cancellations.
In holding the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional, the Court char-
acterized the President’s actions as “[i]n both legal and practical ef-
fect, . . . amend[ing] two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of
each.”213  The Court noted that no provision of the Constitution permits
the President to amend, enact, or repeal a statute.214  While the President
is permitted to veto legislation, the Court found there to be profound
differences between the President’s exercise of the veto and his exercise
of the line item veto.215  The Court then explained that it was proper to
construe constitutional silence on the line item veto “as equivalent to an
express prohibition” because the Article I process for enacting legislation
was “the product of the great debates and compromises that produced the
Constitution itself.”216  In fact, founding era historical sources support
the notion “that the power to enact statutes may only ‘be exercised in
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, proce-
dure,’”217 and the President’s use of the line item veto resulted in short-
ened bills that that were “not the product of the ‘finely wrought’
procedure that the Framers designed.”218  Although the Court did not
delve into the history of the Article I process in its opinion, it did cite to
its opinion in INS v. Chadha, in which the Court looked at the early
historical materials on the Presentment Clause, including the constitu-
tional convention debates, the Federalist Papers, and early
commentators.219
The Government argued that the cancellations were not a repeal be-
cause the “lockbox” provision of the Line Item Veto Act caused the can-
celled provisions to have a real budgetary effect since the President and
Congress were prohibited from spending the savings from the cancella-
210 Id. (quoting Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C § 691(a)(A) (1995), invalidated by Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)).
211 Id. at 435.
212 Id. at 436–37.
213 Id. at 438.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 438–39.
216 Id. at 439.
217 Id. at 439–40 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
218 Id. at 440.
219 Id. (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946–48.
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tions.220  The Court explained that the cancellations still amounted to a
repeal because the President’s action rendered the provisions “entirely
inoperative as to the appellees,” making that action the “functional
equivalent of a partial repeal.”221  The Court also rejected the Govern-
ment’s arguments that the President’s actions were exercises of his dis-
cretionary authority pursuant to the relevant acts or some form of
discretionary spending authority.222  The Court found the first argu-
ment—an analogy to Field v. Clark—inapposite,223 and the second argu-
ment unpersuasive since the line item veto was different from
discretionary spending authority because it allowed the President unilat-
erally to “change the text of duly enacted statutes.”224  Thus, the fatal
flaw in the Line Item Veto Act was that it permitted the President, con-
trary to the procedures set out in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution
for enacting legislation, “to create a different law—one whose text was
not voted on by either House of Congress or presented to the President
for signature.”225  However, as one professor has noted, the Constitution
is silent on many aspects of the legislative process, including bicamera-
lism.226  Thus, the Line Item Veto Act, although not expressly prohibited
in the Constitution, indirectly violated the Constitution by circumventing
the procedures set forth in the Constitution for passing laws.
Dissenting on this point, Justices Breyer and Scalia made this indi-
rect constitutional violation argument more clear.  Justice Breyer pointed
out that in cancelling the provisions, the President did not repeal or
amend the law; rather, he “simply followed the law, leaving the statutes,
as they are literally written, intact”227 by preventing the certain provi-
sions from “having legal force or effect,” a power explicitly given to him
under the law by Congress in the Line Item Veto Act.228  In fact, accord-
ing to Justice Breyer, the “lockbox” feature of the Act did not allow the
President to cancel an item.229  Instead, it allowed him to “decide how to
spend the money . . . either for the specific purpose mentioned . . . or for
general deficit reduction.”230  Justice Scalia agreed that the cancellations
did not raise a Presentment Clause concern, because Congress passed
and the President signed the bills before the cancellations occurred.231
220 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 440–41.
221 Id. at 441.
222 Id. at 442.
223 Id. at 443–44.
224 Id. at 447.
225 Id. at 449.
226 Kysar, supra note 10, at 701. R
227 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 474 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
228 Id.
229 Id. at 479.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 463 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the Court’s real concern was that the Line Item Veto Act permitted
the President to allow certain portions of duly passed statutes to not have
“legal force or effect.”232  While the Constitution would prohibit such an
action absent congressional authority, Congress had long authorized the
President to suspend certain parts of statutes.233
* * *
The Court’s opinions in Term Limits, Powell, and Clinton v. City of
New York seem to create a test by which the Court will protect certain
constitutional provisions from being easily disregarded by the states or
Congress.  As the above descriptions of the cases show, the Court is most
concerned about protecting constitutional provisions that serve as “fun-
damental constitutional safeguards.”  Furthermore, these provisions must
be the product of “finely wrought debate” at the constitutional conven-
tion.  Therefore, the Court seems most concerned about provisions that
were central to the tenuously reached agreements and compromises that
resulted from the debates at the constitutional convention, such as the
provision on representation and the process for passing legislation.  To
protect these compromises, the Court will step in and prevent states and
Congress from indirectly violating these provisions—from taking actions
that the text of the Constitution may permit, but that would render the
particular constitutional guarantee nugatory.  The test that the Court ap-
plies is largely historical—looking at the history surrounding a particular
provision’s adoption at the constitutional convention.  It also looks to
some degree at the provision’s purpose, to the extent the purpose is rele-
vant to understanding the clause, as it was in Term Limits and Powell.
While this test may go beyond the actual text of the Constitution, at least
as we may now understand it, it seeks to implement the original com-
promises or meanings ascribed to the text by the Founding generation by
preventing their compromises from being easily evaded.
B. The Origination Clause
Is the Origination Clause the type of constitutional provision that
should be subject to the historical test set out in Term Limits and Clinton
v. City of New York?  To answer this question, I will first look at the
history of the Origination Clause and its inclusion in the Constitution,
including the debates from the constitutional convention and the ratifying
debates, to determine if it is the type of constitutional provision that
should be protected from indirect violations.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 464.
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1. Constitutional Convention
The Court in Term Limits and Clinton v. City of New York placed
great emphasis on the history surrounding the adoption of the Qualifica-
tions Clauses and the Article I process for passing legislation; the fact
that these provisions were the source of great debate and compromise at
the constitutional convention; and the need to protect the carefully
crafted compromises inferred in the language of these provisions.  The
Origination Clause has a similar history.  In fact, noted legal historian
Charles Warren called the compromise surrounding the adoption of the
Origination Clause “a question which had seriously threatened to break
up the Convention.”234
Under the British Constitution, all bills for raising taxes were re-
quired to originate in the House of Commons, and the House of Lords
lacked the power to amend such bills.235  This privilege extended to
all bills, by which money is directed to be raised upon
the subject, for any purpose or in any shape whatsoever;
either for the exigencies of government, and collected
from the kingdom in general, as the land tax; or for pri-
vate benefit, and collected in any particular district; as
by turnpikes, parish rates, and the like.236
The reason for the provision is unclear.  According to Blackstone, the
reason given for the privilege was that because it is the people that are
taxed, “it is proper that they alone should have the right of taxing them-
selves.”237  But Blackstone disregarded that reason, since the lords
owned “a very large share of property” that was subject to equal taxa-
tion.238  He believed the real reason was that the lords were a “permanent
hereditary body” owing their creation to the king and, “supposed[ly]
more liable to be influenced by the crown”239; thus, “[i]t would . . . be
extremely dangerous, to give them any power of framing new taxes for
the subject.”240  On the other hand, the House of Commons was a tempo-
rary elected body.241
The Founders, likewise, were not in agreement as to the purpose of
the origination provision.  At the Constitutional Convention, James
Madison claimed that commentators “had not yet agreed on the reason”
234 CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 670 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1993) (1928).
235 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *163–64.
236 Id. at *164.
237 Id. at *163–64.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
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for restricting the House of Lords when it came to money bills.242  But,
whatever the reason, the British practice carried over to the colonies.
Seven state constitutions required the lower legislative house to originate
money bills, with only three permitting the upper body to amend such
bills.243
Elbridge Gerry, the Massachusetts delegate who, on June 13, 1787,
proposed the idea at the Constitutional Convention that money bills
should originate in the House, seemed to agree with Blackstone’s reason-
ing.244  He noted that the House was “more immediately the representa-
tives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the
purse-strings.”245  Pierce Butler of South Carolina disagreed, citing “no
analogy” between the House of Lords and the Senate and fearing it
would prevent “the best men” from serving in the Senate.246  Gerry’s
proposal was met with debate and, initially, disapproval by a vote of
three to seven.247  It was brought up again on July 5 as part of the report
of the committee appointed to determine the issue of representation in
Congress—the Great Compromise.248  The committee recommended that
there be proportional representation of states in the House, equal repre-
sentation of states in the Senate, and that “bills for raising or appropriat-
ing money, and for fixing salaries [of government officials]” originate in
the House and that the Senate be prohibited from amending such bills.249
The origination language was considered a concession by the small
states,250 although James Madison questioned this characterization, not-
ing that members of the Senate could easily suggest amendments or bills
to members of the House.251
When the delegates debated the origination provision in more detail
on July 6, the convention was again divided.252  According to Charles
Warren, the states were split into five different factions on the origination
242 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 233 (Yale
Univ. Press 1911).
243 WARREN, supra note 234, at 275.  The seven state constitutions were Delaware, Mary- R
land, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id.  The
three states that allowed the upper body to amend money bills were Delaware, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire. Id.
244 1 FARRAND, supra note 242, at 233.  On May 29, 1787, Charles Pinckney introduced a R
draft constitution that included an Origination Clause.  5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 128–29
(2d. ed. 1836 & Supp. 1845).  However, the first serious discussion of the Origination Clause
came with Gerry’s proposal.
245 1 FARRAND, supra note 242, at 233. R
246 Id.
247 Id. at 233–34.
248 Id. at 526.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 531.
251 Id.at 527.
252 Id. at 544–46.
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issue: (1) the small state delegates who opposed taking the origination
power from the Senate; (2) the small state delegates who were opposed
to the proposal but were willing to vote for it as part of a compromise;
(3) the large state delegates who “regarded it as an essential right to be
possessed by the House since that body as the immediate representatives
of the people ought to have control of the people’s money, and since the
large States would probably have a majority in the House”; (4) the large
state delegates who viewed the origination issue “as of no consequence
and hence as constituting no concession whatever on the part of the
smaller States;” and (5) the large state delegates who viewed taking the
origination power from the Senate as wrong and as a likely “dangerous
source of dispute between the two branches.”253  The convention voted
five to three, with three states divided, to keep the origination provision
in the committee’s report.254
On August 8, the convention reconsidered the origination language
and voted seven to four to strike it.255  Those arguing to strike the provi-
sion claimed, among other things, that it gave “no particular advantage to
the House”; that the Senate was already trusted with great powers, so it
could certainly be trusted with originating money bills; that the Senate,
because it would sit constantly, was better suited to originate money
bills; and that the clause would be a source of “injurious altercations
between the two Houses.”256  Those opposed to striking out the provision
argued that eliminating it would upset the Great Compromise that had
been made.257  The next day, while discussing the article addressing rep-
resentation and voting in the Senate, Edmund Randolph of Virginia
called for reconsideration of the vote, noting that the convention’s ac-
tions in taking out the origination provision “endanger[ed] the success of
the plan.”258  During the discussion, Hugh Williamson from North Caro-
lina explained that his state “had agreed to an equality [of votes] in the
Senate, merely in consideration that money bills should be confined to
the other House.”259  On August 11, the convention voted nine to one,
with one state divided, to reconsider the origination provision.260
The convention took up the reconsideration on August 13, at which
time there was a “violent debate” over the provision.261  Randolph of-
253 WARREN, supra note 234, at 276–77; see also id. at 277 n.1 (Warren’s breakdown of R
positions of the delegates on the issue).
254 1 FARRAND, supra note 242, at 547. R
255 2 FARRAND, supra note 242, at 224–25. R
256 Id. at 224.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 230.
259 Id. at 233.
260 Id. at 262–63.
261 WARREN, supra note 234, at 435. R
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fered amendments to the provision to make it less offensive to those op-
posed to it, including making it clear that the provision only applied to
bills that raised money “for the purpose of revenue.”262  The motion
failed by a vote of four to seven, as did a vote on whether to allow the
Senate to amend revenue bills.263  Notably, General George Washington,
who previously had voted against the origination provision, changed his
vote to “aye” because of the importance of the provision to other mem-
bers of the convention.264  Two days later, Caleb Strong of Massachu-
setts proposed adding an origination provision that permitted the Senate
to amend “bills for raising money for the purposes of revenue.”265  The
decision on Strong’s proposal was postponed on that day and again on
August 21.266
On September 5, the Special Committee of September 4, which had
been constituted to provide solutions to questions surrounding the elec-
tion of the President, the appointment and treaty powers, and the im-
peachment power, offered a solution to the origination issue.267  The
proposed language read: “All bills for raising revenue shall originate in
the House of Representatives, and shall be subject to alterations and
amendments by the Senate: No money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”268  The vote on the
clause, however, was postponed again.269  On September 8, the proposal
was amended by voice vote to replace the language “and shall be subject
to alterations and amendments by the Senate,” with language from the
Massachusetts Constitution that read “but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments as in other bills.”270  The provision finally
passed by a vote of nine to two.271
The records of the constitutional convention show that the Origina-
tion Clause, like the Qualifications Clauses and the issues of bicamera-
lism and presentment, was to refer back to the language in Clinton v. City
of New York, “the product of the great debates and compromises that
produced the Constitution itself.”272  While the delegates held diverse
views on the Clause, it was ultimately included first as part of the Great
262 2 FARRAND, supra note 242, at 273. R
263 Id. at 280.
264 Id. at 280 n.*.
265 Id. at 297.
266 Id. at 298, 357–58.
267 WARREN, supra note 234, at 664. R
268 2 FARRAND, supra note 242, at 508–09. R
269 Id. at 510.
270 Id. at 552.  It was changed to “as on other bills” in the referral to the Committee on
Style. Id. at 568.
271 Id. at 552.
272 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439 (1998); see also supra notes
244–71 and accompanying text. R
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Compromise, and second, as part of agreements regarding the scope of
the Senate’s power—two of the most contentious issues at the Constitu-
tional Convention.  Thus, the agreement reached on the Clause can be
said to be “finely wrought,” meeting the standard set out in Clinton v.
City of New York273 in that its text was the source of debate, revision, and
compromise.  The Origination Clause can also be seen as a provision the
framers “intended to be a fundamental constitutional safeguard.”274
Some of the delegates at the convention clearly saw the provision as
ensuring that the taxing power remained in the hands of the representa-
tives closest to the people.275  This view was also put forth by Madison,
an opponent of the Clause, in Federalist 58.276  Therefore, the first part of
the test is met.
2. State Ratifying Conventions
In addition to being a source of debate at the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the Origination Clause was a source of debate at the state ratifying
conventions.  In general, it was viewed as a clause to curb power abuses.
At the Massachusetts ratifying convention, in response to an argu-
ment that “the power to raise money may be abused,” Judge Sumner
cited the Origination Clause and asked,
can we suppose the representatives of Georgia, or any
other state, more disposed to burden their constituents
with taxes, than the representatives of Massachusetts?  It
is not to be supposed; for, whatever is for the interest of
one state, in this particular, will be the interest of all the
states, and no doubt attended to by the House of
Representatives.277
Delegate Parsons also cited the Origination Clause as a means for the
House “to control the Senate.”278  Parsons recognized that some objected
to the Senate’s power to amend money bills, which may allow the Senate
to “increase the supplies, and establish profuse salaries,” but he was not
concerned with that power since the Senate could, without such power,
informally suggest amendments to the House.279
273 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439–40.
274 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833 (1995).
275 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 242, at 274–75, 278. R
276 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
histdox/fed_58.html (“This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most com-
plete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives
of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just
and salutary measure.”).
277 2 ELLIOT, supra note 244, at 163. R
278 Id. at 92.
279 Id. at 383.
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At the North Carolina ratifying convention, Delegate Iredell, in dis-
cussing the power of the House of Representatives as compared to the
Senate, explained that the House, which would represent the people,
“will originate all money bills, which is one of the greatest securities in
any republican government.”280  Later in the ratifying convention, Iredell
responded to an argument that the Senate was too powerful by compar-
ing the Senate to its British equivalent and noting how important the
origination power is to the ability of government to function.281  Iredell
explained that the constitutional convention debated giving the Senate
the power to originate money bills, but he praised the delegates for re-
fraining from that action.282
At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, Delegate M’Kean, in re-
sponse to the argument that the powers of Congress were too “large,”
especially with respect to taxation, noted that tax laws “must originate
with the immediate representatives of the people.”283  The ability of the
House to control the public money was also cited by Delegate Wilson as
a check on the Senate’s power.284  In Virginia, Delegate Randolph cited
the Origination Clause in response to a concern about standing armies,
arguing that the “consent of the democratic branch” was needed for
every bill, and that “money bills can originate with them only.”285  At the
South Carolina convention, Charles Pinckney described the House as
having the ability, partially through the Origination Clause, to curb the
power abuses of other departments.286
At least one delegate at the ratifying convention, however, under-
stood the Origination Clause to permit the Senate to delete and replace
bills.  At the Virginia convention, Delegate Grayson complained that the
Senate’s power to amend money bills was “equal, in principle, to that of
originating.”287  Madison responded that he never viewed the Origination
Clause as that important and that “[t]here [wa]s some difference, though
280 4 ELLIOT, supra note 244, at 39. R
281 Id. at 129.
282 Id.
283 2 ELLIOT, supra note 244, at 536. R
284 Id. at 508.
285 3 ELLIOT, supra note 244, at 600. R
286 4 ELLIOT, supra note 244, at 329–30 (“The House of Representatives, in which the R
people of the Union are proportionably represented, are to be biennially elected by them.
Those appointments are sufficiently short to render the member as dependent as he ought to be
upon his constituents.  They are the moving-spring of the system.  With them all grants of
money are to originate: on them depend the wars we shall be engaged in, the fleets and armies
we shall raise and support, the salaries we shall pay; in short, on them depend the appropria-
tions of money, and consequently all the arrangements of government.  With this powerful
influence of the purse, they will be always able to restrain the usurpations of the other depart-
ments, while their own licentiousness will, in its turn, be checked and corrected by them.”).
287 3 ELLIOT, supra note 244, at 375. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-3\CJP302.txt unknown Seq: 37  2-APR-15 9:25
2015] THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE 487
not considerable” between originating and amending bills.288  Grayson
objected that he still considered the powers to be the same, noting that
“[t]he Senate could strike out every word of the bill, except the word
whereas, or any other introductory word, and might substitute new words
of their own.”289  While Grayson’s understanding of the Clause was pro-
phetic, it is not clear if others concurred in his understanding of it.
The arguments at the state ratifying conventions demonstrate that
the Origination Clause was viewed as an important constitutional safe-
guard in that it checked, at a minimum, the power of the Senate, and it
could also serve as a check on the other governmental departments.
3. Constitutional Commentaries
In Term Limits and Powell, part of the Court’s analysis of the rele-
vant constitutional provisions included exploring how those provisions
were interpreted in leading constitutional commentaries of that time.290
These same commentaries also provide some insight into the Origination
Clause’s purpose.  In general, the reasons given in the commentaries are
consistent with the discussion at the Constitutional Convention and in the
state ratifying conventions.  For example, two constitutional commenta-
ries cited the provision as important in maintaining the balance of power
between the small and large states.291  These commentators also pointed
to purpose of the provision as being to protect the people from oppres-
sion.292  Charles Warren, in his commentary on the constitutional con-
vention, noted that convention delegates Mason, Dickinson, and Gerry
all agreed that “‘[t]axation and representation are strongly associated in
the minds of the people, and they will not agree that any but their imme-
diate representatives shall meddle with their purse.  In short, the accept-
ance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be not restrained from
originating money bills.’”293  Taxation without representation or consent
was certainly a concern of the founding generation.294
288 Id. at 377.
289 Id.
290 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 521, 526, 537–38 (1969).
291 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE,
app. note D, pt. 2 (1803) (noting that the Origination Clause provided protection against “un-
due weight of the smaller states . . . in the imposition of [tax] burdens” as one of the reasons
for the Origination Clause.  Story also noted that the Origination Clause “was indispensable to
preserve the equality of the small states, and to reconcile them to a surrender of their sover-
eignty.”  2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, bk.
III, ch. IX, § 671 (1833).
292 1 TUCKER, supra note 291, at app. note D, pt. 5; 2 STORY, supra note 291, at bk. III, R
ch. IX, § 572 (1833).
293 Warren, supra note 234, at 275. R
294 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2, fact 17 (U.S. 1776) (including in the
list of British tyrannies, “imposing Taxes on us without our Consent.”); Patrick Henry, Vir-
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Several commentators, however, noted that the Senate had the
power to amend revenue bills.295  In fact, one commentator made the
point that the Origination Clause “[a]s it appears in the Constitution it is
not really a substantial limitation upon the Senate because of that body’s
right to amend.”296  St. George Tucker, in his edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, also noted that if one looked at the early journals of the
Senate, one would find that “several acts for establishing the post-office;
for regulating the value of foreign coins, and for establishing a mint, all
originated in the senate.”297  The reason, he believed, that the House ac-
quiesced to this action was that “no revenue was intended to be drawn to
the government by these laws.”298
Thus, while the commentators provide no support for narrowly in-
terpreting the Senate’s power to amend revenue bills, they do affirm the
important purposes behind including the Clause in the Constitution.
4. Legislative Practice
As discussed in Term Limits and Powell, early congressional prac-
tice provides insight into how the Clause was interpreted by those the
Clause’s language most immediately affected, although congressional
practice can be “erratic” and of limited precedential value.299  Just as the
Qualifications Clauses restricted Congress and the states from adding
qualifications, and early congressional experience with the Clauses
showed how Congress monitored that restriction, reviewing how early
Congresses addressed potential Origination Clause violations can show
how that Clause was interpreted.
The early legislative practice shows that the House, at times, took a
narrow view of the Origination Clause, especially with respect to the
Senate’s ability to amend revenue bills.  For example, in 1807, after the
Senate amended a bill dealing with salt duties and protecting commerce
from pirates, the House returned the bill with a message refusing to agree
to the amendments.300  During the debate on the amendments, Represen-
tative John Randolph, stepson to St. George Tucker, criticized the Senate
amendments as going “beyond amendment of the details of the bill,”
ginia Stamp Act Resolutions (May 30, 1765), in JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF
VIRGINIA, 1761–1765 (John Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1907).
295 See CHARLES KELLOGG BURDICK & FRANCIS MARION BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 155 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons ed.,
1922); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 132 (Little et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1871); WARREN, supra note 234, at 275–77. R
296 BURDICK & BURDICK, supra note 295, at 155. R
297 1 TUCKER, supra note 291, at app. note D, pt. 5. R
298 Id. at app. note D, pt. 5 n.188.
299 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 819 (1995).
300 2 HINDS, supra note 134, § 1481. R
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noting that “under the Constitution he believed the Senate had no power
to amend a money bill by varying the objects or altering the quantum.”301
In 1859, the House approved a resolution declaring that Senate amend-
ment to a post office appropriations bill, which raised the rate of postage,
was a revenue-raising bill for purposes of the Origination Clause,302 al-
though at least one court had disagreed with that determination.303  Dur-
ing discussions on the House resolution, however, one House member
argued that the Origination Clause only applied to bills that fell under
Congress’s taxing power.304  On the other hand, the House did not con-
sider a bill “to fix the amount of United States notes and the circulation
of national banks, and for other purposes” to be a bill that needed to
originate in the House, despite Representative Garfield’s objection.305
Additionally, the House has interpreted the Origination Clause to
also apply to Senate bills repealing taxes, noting that under the Constitu-
tion, it is the House’s right to originate “all bills relating directly to taxa-
tion, including all bills imposing or remitting taxes.”306  In 1872, the
Senate used what sounds like a delete and replace process to replace a
House bill that cut duties on coffee and tea with a bill more generally
reducing taxes.307  The House objected, passing a resolution that said that
the Senate’s actions “‘conflict[ed] with the true intent and purpose of
[the Origination] clause.’”308  The Senate disagreed with the House’s
contentions, arguing for a broad right to amend revenue bills.309
Congressional practice also provides insight into what was consid-
ered a revenue-raising amendment.  In 1864, the House objected to, and
the Senate agreed to pull, Senate amendments to a bill “enrolling and
calling out the national forces” that set forth a “5 per cent duty on all
incomes.”310  The Senate acted in a similar manner in 1905 when the
House complained about revenue provisions the Senate added to an ap-
propriations bill.311  Early congressional practice also shows instances in
which the Senate decided not to originate a bill when a question was
raised about the Origination Clause.312
301 Id.
302 Id. § 1485.
303 See id. § 1494 (discussing a court decision, United States ex rel. Michels v. James, 26
F. Cas. 577 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875), in which a raise in postal rates was not deemed a revenue-
raising bill).
304 Id. § 1485.
305 Id. § 1490.
306 Id. § 1488.
307 Id. § 1489.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. § 1486.
311 Id. § 1493.
312 See id. § 1482 (bill “raise[d] the duty on certain articles”); see id. § 1483 (bill abol-
ished salt duties).
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Later congressional precedents also provide examples in which the
House and Senate have struggled with the scope of the Origination
Clause and the House’s prerogative to originate revenue-raising bills.313
While the congressional precedent is somewhat mixed, it does demon-
strate an early effort by the House to protect its prerogative.
* * *
Although there was a diversity of views on the Origination Clause
at both the Constitutional Convention and at the state ratifying conven-
tions, overall the clause was seen as curbing or balancing the Senate’s
power (and maintaining a balance among the states).  It was also seen as
a protection against tyranny by keeping the power to tax closest to the
most immediate representatives of the people.  The Clause was heavily
debated and a part of the most important and controversial decisions and
compromises at the Constitutional Convention—those involving repre-
sentation and the Senate’s power.  It seems to clearly fall under the
description of a “finely wrought provision” and appears to be exactly the
type of provision that the Court should protect from indirect constitu-
tional violations under the standard set forth in Term Limits and Clinton
v. City of New York.
CONCLUSION—ACA AND INDIRECT CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Since the Origination Clause is the type of constitutional provision
that the Court normally seeks to protect from indirect constitutional vio-
lations, did the ACA’s passage amount to an indirect violation?  Given
the Origination Clause’s history, the Senate could indirectly violate the
Clause in two primary ways.  First, assuming the Court agrees that any
bill justified only under Congress’s taxing power qualifies as a revenue-
raising bill for purposes of the Clause, the Senate could attempt to add a
provision to a House bill that raises significant revenue but is justified
under another congressional power, such as the Commerce Clause.  In
the case of the ACA, however, the Supreme Court, in deciding that the
individual mandate was only constitutional under Congress’s taxing
power, protected against this indirect violation.314
The second way that the Senate could indirectly violate the Origina-
tion Clause would be by “amending” a bill in such a way as to so radi-
cally change it so that the new amended legislation is, in essence, a new
piece of legislation that “originated” in the Senate.  This is what hap-
pened with the ACA.  The Senate’s use of delete and replace to com-
313 See 6 Cannon’s Precedents §§ 314–22 (1935); 7 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS Ch. 25
§§ 13–20 (1994).
314 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
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pletely remove the original text of H.R. 3590 and replace it with the
Senate-generated health care plan went beyond the act of simple amend-
ment and amounted to originating a new revenue-raising bill in the Sen-
ate, something the Origination Clause was enacted to guard against.
While the Origination Clause’s text permits the Senate to amend reve-
nue-raising bills, to completely delete the House’s text and substitute en-
tirely new (and unrelated) language, while it may technically be an
“amendment” in the modern sense of the word,315 goes beyond the pur-
pose of the Clause and what it was designed to protect against—just like
allowing a ballot access restriction to act as a Qualification creates an
indirect constitutional violation.
Furthermore, given the history behind the Origination Clause in the
Constitution and the important role that the Clause played in constitu-
tional compromises over representation and separation of powers, al-
lowing the spirit of the Clause to be ignored by permitting the Senate to
delete and replace the ACA would upset the “finely wrought” system of
checks and balances and separation of powers set up by our constitu-
tional system.  This is especially true given the political situation follow-
ing Senator Scott Brown’s election.  Because the Senate Democrats lost
their filibuster-proof majority with Senator Brown’s election, it would
have been very difficult for the House to amend the ACA and return it to
the Senate or push for a conference committee to work out the differ-
ences between the two plans.  Any national health care reform legislation
that met the President’s broad goals would have struggled to garner sixty
votes in the Senate after Senator Brown’s election.  Thus, the House
Democrats were faced with two options—pass, without amendment, a
bill that they did not prefer, or be the reason that the President’s key
policy initiative failed.  Recall that in the discussion over the Origination
Clause, one of the reasons for supporting the Clause was that the House
would be the immediate representative of the people and hold tightly to
315 The Senate’s action of completely replacing the text may have gone beyond the histor-
ical understanding of amendment.  For example, Webster’s 1828 dictionary defined amend-
ment as “[a] word, clause or paragraph, added or proposed to be added to a bill before a
legislature.”  1 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 148 (1st ed. 1828), available at http://www.archive
.org/stream/americandictiona01websrich#page/148/mode/2up.  (This was the second definition
for the term.  The first definition was “[a]n alteration or change for the better; correction of a
fault or faults; reformation of life, by quitting vices.” Id.).  Black’s Law Dictionary defined
the term, with respect to legislation, as “[a] modification or alteration proposed to be made in a
bill on its passage, or an enacted law; also such modification or change when made.”  BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 67 (1st ed. 1891), available at http://www.blacks.worldfreemansociety.org/
1/A/a-0067.jpg.  Black’s defined “modification” as “[a] change; an alteration which introduces
new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and
effect of the subject-matter intact.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 783 (1st ed. 1891), available
at http://www.blacks.worldfreemansociety.org/1/M/m-0783.jpg.  Neither of these definitions
envisions a complete substitution.
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the power of the purse.316  As the court recognized in United States ex
rel. Michels v. James, the House would have “immediate responsibility
to their constituents, and their jealous regard for the pecuniary interests
of the people, it was supposed, would render them especially watchful in
the protection of those whom they represented.”317  The Senate’s use of
delete and replace, especially in this instance, took away the House’s
important structural role.
Finally, as discussed above, the history of the Origination Clause’s
adoption shows that, just like the Qualifications Clauses and the Article I
legislative process, it is the type of structural constitutional guarantee—
born from the compromises at the Constitutional Convention—that the
Court has protected from indirect violations.  Just like the Court pre-
vented Arkansas from circumventing the Qualifications Clause by limit-
ing congressional terms through a ballot access provisions and the
President from circumventing the Article I process through the use of the
line item veto, the Court should prevent the Senate from circumventing
the Origination Clause by using its amendment power under the Origina-
tion Clause to delete and replace the ACA into law.  Permitting the Sen-
ate to use delete and replace renders the Origination Clause a
meaningless constitutional provision.
316 See supra notes 235–45 and accompanying text. R
317 United States ex. rel. Michels v. James, 26 F. Cas. 577, 578 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875).
